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Abstract—Spectrum policy in the US (and throughout most of
the world) consists generally of a set of nationally determined
policies that apply uniformly to all localities. However, it is
also true that there is considerable variation in the features
(e.g., traffic demand or population density), requirements and
constraints of spectrum use on a local basis. Global spectrum
policies designed to resolve a situation in New York City could
well be overly restrictive for communities in rural areas (such as
central Wyoming). At the same time, it is necessary to ensure that
more permissive policies of central Wyoming would not create
problems for NYC (by ensuring, for example, that relocated
radios adapt to local policies). Notions of polycentric governance
that have been articulated by the late E. Ostrom [16] argue that
greater good can be achieved by allowing for local autonomy in
resource allocation.
Shared access to spectrum is generally mediated through one
of several technologies. As shown in [21], approaches mediated
by geolocation databases are the most cost effective in today’s
technology. In the database oriented Spectrum Access System,
or SAS, proposed by the FCC, users are granted (renewable)
usage rights based on their location for a limited period of
time. Because this system grants usage rights on a case-by-
case basis, it may also allow for greater local autonomy while
still maintaining global coordination. For example, it would be
technically feasible for the database to include parameters such as
transmit power, protocol, and bandwidth. Thus, they may provide
the platform by which polycentric governance might come to
spectrum management. In this paper, we explore, through some
case examples, what polycentric governance of spectrum might
look like and how this could be implemented in a database-driven
spectrum management system.
In many ways this paper is a complement to [20], which eva-
luted emerging SAS architectures using Ostrom’s socioeconomic
theory. This paper explores how a SAS-based system could be
constructed that is consistent with Ostrom’s polycentric gover-
nance ideas. Our approach is to address spectrum management as
an emergent phenomenon rather than a top down system. This
paper will describe the key details of this system and present
some initial modeling results in comparison with the traditional
global model of spectrum regulation. It will also discuss some of
the concerns associated with this approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Spectrum policy in the US (and throughout most of the
world) consists generally of a set of nationally determined
policies that apply more or less uniformly to all localities.
However, the economics, user needs, and technical consid-
erations of spectrum are geospatially very different. The
population density of New York City (NYC) is 27016 people
per square mile1 while the population density of Eugene,
Oregon is 3572 people/square mile2. The building profile in
NYC is very different from that in Eugene, thereby creating
very different radio propagation characteristics. These numbers
illustrate the stark differences between two cities in the US.
When we extend such considerations to rural communities,
the differences become more drastic. Inhabited ranches may
be separated by miles – applications may require wireless com-
munication technology for herding of cattle across thousands
of square miles with very few human beings in contrast to
watching HD videos with Netflix in an apartment complex
while competing with many similar streams in close proximity.
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the spectrum
policies designed to resolve a situation in NYC could well be
overly restrictive for communities in central Wyoming.
Technologies for wireless systems have undergone rapid
changes in the past two decades. Mass production of wireless
chipsets and the ability to rapidly tweak them are real pos-
sibilities. Similarly, spectrum policy has seen rapid changes
in the last years. The historical presumption in favor of ex-
clusive license based access has changed. The introduction of
unlicensed bands introduced new models for and applications
of spectrum use. Beginning in the early 2000s [11], we began
to see a serious engineering and policy thrust in support of
the development of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) systems
that would enable much denser sharing of electrospace3. The
emergence of this new policy thrust was enabled by the
development of reconfigurable radios, such as software radios
and cognitive radios.
The same technologies that have facilitated more intensive
sharing of spectrum also allow for a broad new approach
to spectrum policy. Instead of a “one size fits all” spectrum
policy, it is now possible to have local spectrum policy
that is tailored to the needs and spectrum environments of
particular communities. The FCC has already taken steps
in this direction in the CBRS (3.5GHz) proceeding [9] by
allowing higher power levels in rural areas than in urban ones.
While this is certainly a positive development, it still relies on a
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of United States cities by
population density
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eugene, Oregon
3This term is used to describe a multidimensional space for spectrum
occupancy or use [5], [15]
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1 Boundaries 5 Graduated Sanctions
2 Appropriatness 6 Conflict Resolution Mech.
3 Collective Choice 7 Minimal Recog. of Rights
4 Monitoring 8 Nested Enterprises
TABLE I: Critical attributes of long surviving CPR systems
centralized Spectrum Access System (SAS) that is most likely
not governed locally. Inspired by experiences with polycentric
governance of common pool resource systems, we propose
that this spectrum policy can be locally determined through
automated and semi-automated negotiation between devices.
If radio spectrum can be best classified as a common pool
resource system, the question that naturally arises is whether
(and when) the kind of durable, decentralized governance
system characterized by Ostrom and her collaborators can be
developed.
Shared access to spectrum is generally mediated through
one of several technologies. As Weiss et.al. [21] show, ap-
proaches mediated by geolocation databases are the most cost
effective in today’s technology. In this paper, we explore how
the database technology on which many modern spectrum
sharing systems are built (e.g., TV White Spaces, Spectrum
Access Systems [8], License Shared Access) can also be used
as a foundation for the kind of resource governance system
described by Ostrom [16]. Such a system will effectively
implement a differential spectrum policy that is designed to
optimize locally where possible. In these systems, users are
granted (renewable) usage rights based on their location for
a limited period of time. Because this system grants usage
rights on a case-by-case basis, it may also allow for greater
local autonomy while still maintaining global coordination.
For example, it would be technically feasible for the database
or SAS to include parameters such as transmit power, protocol,
and bandwidth. Thus, they may provide the platform by which
polycentric governance might come to spectrum management.
In the following discussion, we use a very flexible notion of
SAS to illustrate the principles behind polycentric governance
of spectrum. Later we use the idea of a radio appliance (RA)
to consider a more detailed version of polycentric governance.
II. REQUIREMENTS AND SYSTEM OPERATION
In the body of her work, Elinor Ostrom studied frameworks
for the governance of common pool resource systems [16].
Several researchers have argued that spectrum meets the
definition of common pool resource systems under our current
technological endowment [13], [20]. Ostrom identified the list
of attributes for the governance of long surviving common
pool resource (CPR) systems contained in Table I.
Ostrom and her collaborators studied resource systems
such as fisheries, forests and irrigation systems. Unlike these
systems, spectrum is a constructed resource that does not exist
apart from radio technology [19], [20] 4. Thus, it is necessary
4Prior to Marconi, there was no discussion of spectrum rights. The need for
spectrum coordination and the emergence of rights associated with spectrum
grew with radio technology and its use [12].
Full Prop- Auth. Auth. Auth.
owner rietor claimant xmitter Rcvr
Access X X X X X
Withdrawal X X X X
Management X X X
Exclusion X X
Alienation X
TABLE II: Distribution of rights by user type
to construct a technological foundation for a decentralized
governance system for spectrum.
1. Boundaries: In Ostrom’s description, two types of
boundaries are relevant: those that define the user com-
munity and those that define the resource. Resource
boundaries are often physical delimitations of what is
included in the governance system and what is excluded.
For spectrum, the physical delimitation is largely deter-
mined by the electrospace of the transmission system.
From a system design persective, this is determined
by technical parameters such as transmission power,
frequency band, antenna height, antenna type, etc.
User boundaries are more challenging. Here, the rights
structure and governance systems come into play. To
address this, Schlager and Ostrom [18] developed the
rights typology defined in Table II (adapted here for
application to radio spectrum). “Access” and “With-
drawal” rights are referred to as usage rights whereas
the remaining are referred to as collective action rights.
In this context, collective action rights are implemented
in the SAS5, and these, in turn, govern the usage rights.
Locally determined spectrum policy, then, means a (hy-
per) local SAS. The user community, then, is determined
by the the local SAS, which must coordinate with
adjacent (and nearby) local SASs or, possibly, a regional
SAS.
2. Appropriateness to local conditions This item includes
(a) “rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or
quantity of resource units are related to local conditions”
as well as (b) “The benefits obtained by users from a
CPR, as determined by appropriation rules, are propor-
tional to the amount of inputs required in the form of
labor, material, or money, as determined by provision
rules.” (from [3])
This is the attribute that is perhaps of most interest
here. Appropriateness to local conditions means that the
economic and management relationships are appropriate
for the local conditions and the people affected.
3. Collective Choice Arrangements This item addresses
the extent to which participants in the CPR system have
a say in its management; that is, are endowed with and
able to execute their collective choice rights.
In spectrum sharing, collective choice is embodied in
local SASs as well as in the protocol that implements
5Since we are envisioning an environment of nested rights, this may refer
to the system of SASs in reality.
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Type 1 Events due to the routine operation of a sharing ecosystem
Type 2 Events due to “rogue” or malicious users
Type 3 Events due to faulty equipment of authorized spectrum users
Type 4 Events when all users are in compliance with regulations
TABLE III: A typology of intereference events
inter-SAS coordination [20].
The next three items address the enforcement of CPR
governance relationships. Enforcement has been addressed
elsewhere (see, for example, [22]); in brief, it is necessary
to enforce both usage rights and collective action rights.
Usage rights in spectrum as a common pool resource are
typically expressed in the form of interference protection.
Enforceable interference events might be subdivided into four
distinct types, as outlined in Table III.
Type 1 interference events might occur due to aggregation of
similar devices, propagation anomalies, location errors, etc. In
these kinds of events, we expect that the radios are compliant
with applicable technical and operational regulations. We
cannot say the same about Type 2 interferers, which might
be software radios that have temporarily been programmed to
operate in a band and may not make an effort at compliance
with the appropriate technical and operational requirements.
These may or may not have a typical physical characteristic
that would allow them to be automatically identified. Type
3 events are due to leaky cables, poor filters, etc. We would
expect these to be licensed devices that fit no particular pattern
or lack a particular physical characteristic. Type 4 events occur
when regulations or licenses are incomplete and/or poorly
written or assigned.
For the purpose of this paper, we consider only Type 1
events, which is also generally the focus of the CPR literature.
Other types of interference events are also of substantial
importance, but that is outside the scope of this paper.
Weiss et.al. [20] have made a case for the need to enforce
collective action rights as well as interference rights in spec-
trum sharing systems. To date, collective action rights have
been exerted through the NTIA’s CSMAC6 process and in
the FCC (through the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)).
As Cox et.al. point out transparency is of importance for
sustainable CPR management; in spectrum systems, these
collective action is codified in software-based SAS systems
which will require transparency as well.
4. Monitoring This refers to the ability to observe and
audit the use and governance of the CPR system. It also
refers to the ability to monitor the overall “health” of the
system. The accountability of monitors to the members
of the benefactors of the CPR is important as well.
For spectrum, this can imply the need to monitor spec-
trum use, or have the ability to detect interference that
rises above a “harm-claim threshold” [6]. As to the
second component, the “health” of the ecosystem can
perhaps best be measured by the noise floor [10].
6https://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/csmac
5. Graduated Sanctions When violations of the opera-
tional rules occur, sustainable CPRs allow for sanctions
that are scaled to the seriousness and context of the
offense. Sanctions may be assessed by other benefactors
and/or officials who are accountable to them.
Some research on appropriate and effective sanctions
has been performed by Woyach and Sahai [24], [25].
In their work, they focus on non-monetary “spectrum
jails” that penalize misappropriators. Alternately, Malki
and Weiss [14] consider penalties in the context of the
law and economics literature. In both cases, the penalties
and sanctions have been focussed on interference events.
Work remains to be performed on how sanctions might
be applied when collective action rights are violated.
6. Conflict Resolution Mechanism Also of importance is
rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts
among benefactors or between benefactors and officials.
The federal enforcement system currently in place
through the FCC’s enforcement bureau does not meet
this criterion. It is neither local or low cost. Thus, a
local system must include a mechanism for automated
or semi-automated negotiations among systems to coor-
dinate their usage of spectrum.
The remaining factors refer to the broad institutional context
in which the CPR exists. On the one hand, there is a question
of legal context and on the other, one of broader operational
context.
7. Minimal Recognition of Rights This refers to a formal
(or informal) recognition by central authorities of the
self-governance of local authorities. The FCC already
delegates spectrum management functions to organiza-
tions such as the ARRL [4]. As well, the databases for
the TVWS and CBRS are effectively managing spectrum
on behalf of the FCC, so it seems that this recognition
would, in principle, be possible.
8. Nested Enterprises In many sustainable CPR systems,
the use, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict
resolution, and governance activities are organized in
multiple layers of nested enterprises. This is helpful
because (a) CPR systems exist in a broader environment
that may require external coordination; (b) not all con-
flicts and disputes can be resolved locally, so it might
be necessary to appeal to an independent authority; (c)
it may be more cost effective to use a super-local or
regional entity to coordinate usage than to resolve usage
or governance conflicts locally.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND CASE STUDIES
The current trend toward database-oriented spectrum shar-
ing systems allows for the implementation of a decentralized
spectrum policy. We envision a system based on a geo-
located and networked “radio appliance” (RA) that controls the
protocols and transmission parameters of the radios associated
with it. It is effectively a small scale Spectrum Access System
(SAS). This appliance (and the associated radios) might be
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Requirement System Feature
Boundaries Operating boundaries determined
by transmit power and antenna
Congruence with Local Conditions Locally determined spectrum
assignment and usage
Collective Choice Arrangements Open source software for
radio appliance
Monitoring Users & resource Identifying users and documenting
transmission & spectrum sensing
Graduated Sanctions Backoff protocol and explicit
coordination
Conf!ict Resolution Mechanisms Protocols for negotiating
interference protection
Minimal Recognition of Rights Delegation of spectrum control
by FCC, NTIA and SAS operators
Nested Enterprises Ability to self-organize &
delegate spectrum control
TABLE IV: Architecture requirements
owned and operated by a landlord, a farmer, an Internet service
provider, etc.
When an RA is installed and powered up, it locates itself,
registers itself and obtains an operating license and learns
about neighboring RAs. If there are no nearby RAs, the
operating parameters of the radios, such as power, bandwidth,
protocols (e.g. waiting times in WiFi) would gradually become
more permissive until (a) it can meet the requirements of the
application in question or (b) an enforceable event occurred.
If (a) occurs, the system would maintain steady state, making
small adjustments to account for environmental variations
(e.g., weather). If instead (b) occurs, the RA would automati-
cally cause the parameters to become more restrictive before
gradually increasing again to find the maximum possible
performance7. As additional RAs come on line, the RAs would
begin to negotiate with each other, coordinating frequency
usage, time of use, transmission protocol, etc. to minimize the
occurrence of Type 1 interference events. If the time required
to compute an acceptable allocation becomes too large, the
affected RAs defer to a super-local RA. This might be a
separate, specialized entity or a software process within each
RA that could be invoked.
If, upon powerup, the RA learns that there are other RAs
nearby (as might be the case in a suburban or urban area),
the RA first determines whether coordination will be required
(based on the distance to other RAs). If none is required, it
proceeds as described above. If it is required, the RA requests
an electrospace allocation for its operation either through
negotiation with neighboring RAs or from the super-local RA.
In Table IV, we show how this approach could implement
a decentralized spectrum policy regime in the context of
sustainable CPR systems.
To illustrate operation, we will consider two cases. The first
is a macro-level case that uses the 3.5 GHz band Citizens
Broadband Radio Service. Here we will not consider protocols,
but instead look at the coverage and interference aspects.
7This is generally similar to the “slow start” mechanism of TCP (https:
//web.stanford.edu/class/cs244e/papers/rfc2001.pdf)
The second is a more fine-grained case of 802.11 at the
protocol level. In this case, we will examine the impact of
locally adapting the protocol parameters. Both cases make
assumptions that are not necessarily realistic, but the objective
here is to assess the possibilities with polycentric governance,
rather than creating realistic simulations.
A. Case I: Citizens Broadband Radio Service
We begin with a very rural situation: a ranch in central
Wyoming. This region is outside of the incumbent’s exclusion
zone so sensing naval radars is not a concern. Suppose the
rancher wishes to monitor the location and health of her cattle
and acquires the proposed radio system. The RA is installed
centrally with a tower and an antenna. The radio-based cattle
monitors are strapped to the animals. The RA begins by
registering itself over the Internet and acquiring information
about neighboring RAs and the governance structure in place.
In our example, we assume no nearby RAs, so the radios
and RA begin by operating with “stock” radio parameters as
specfied by the FCC for the 3.5GHz band. The RA begins
permitting the associated radio devices to gradually increase
their power until adequate performance is achieved over the
entire ranch.
Let us now assume that a nearby ranch also acquires a
similar system. When their RA (RA2) is powered on, it learns
of the presence and location of RA1. It also learns that a
fully decentralized governance system is in place and that it is
outside of the incumbent exclusion zone. If these two RAs are
sufficiently far apart to not interfere with each other under the
“stock” transmission parameters, like RA1, it would choose
the best modulation scheme, as much channel bandwidth and
channel time as needed for the application and gradually
increase transmission power until adequate performance is
acheived over their entire ranch.
This might continue unabated if the two ranches are ge-
ographically separate. If they are adjacent, it is likely that
transmissions associated with RA1 would eventually interfere
with transmissions associated with RA2 (or vice versa). If
interference reached a level where the application perfor-
mance was sufficiently impaired, RA1 or RA2 (whichever first
detected the problem) would initiate a negotiation with the
other. The RAs can coordinate on transmit power, frequency,
time or modulation scheme to mitigate the interference; trans-
mit power would affect reach, frequency band would affect
bandwidth, time would affect latency (as well as bandwidth),
and modulation might strike a different balance between the
three. Each RA would prefer to minimize the consequence
of the negotiation on the performance of the application. In
the case of the cattle monitoring application, the RAs might
prefer to maintain higher power levels at the cost of decreased
throughput or increased latency so that the entire ranch can be
covered.
If these radio systems became popular in the area, then bi-
lateral coordination would no long function efficiently. In these
cases, one of the radios would be elected to be the spectrum
coordinator, SC, (this could also potentially rotate among the
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RAs in the region). The SC’s function would be to allocate
the regional spectrum resources among the associated RAs so
to optimize its use. This SC would need to be aware of other
SCs in the region and to coordinate with super-regional SASs
(i.e., participate in a nested governance system).
An enforceable event occurs when the transmission of a
radio device associated with one appliance diminishes the
operation of a radio associated with a different appliance to the
point where the function of the radio application is measurably
impaired (e.g., latency, throughput). An enforceable event
would trigger an automated negotiation protocol whose goal is
modifying the radio parameters to minimize the consequence
of sharing. The outcome of the negotiation might be decreasing
transmission power, coordinating the frequency bands used,
time sharing the transmissions, etc. The radio appliances
would then gradually increase power until another enforceable
event occurred.
It may also involve fusing authenticated data regarding
the enforceable event. If the frequency of enforceable events
increased above a threshold, a super local (or regional) co-
ordinating device would be invoked to optimize use of the
spectrum. In this way, spectrum governance is nested [1],
providing resilience against a single point of failure in the
governance process.
This represents a means to learn from the local knowledge
and policy changes, which results in a system that is more
responsive to environment threats at multiple scales. In the
end, this system can compensate for the failure of some units
with the successful response of others [2]. This can be an
advantage with respect to global policy mechanisms. Thus
spectrum management would be best modelled as an emergent
phenomenon rather than a top down system.
B. Case II: IEEE 802.11 Protocol Tweaks
Urban environments with dense deployment of WiFi ac-
cess points provide another environment where polycentric
governance of radio spectrum regulation may make sense.
In apartment complexes and other densely populated urban
areas, it is likely that a variety of usage scenarios exist. It
is possible that there are low and bursty data rate users that
primarily browse e-mails and the web, as well as very high
data rate users that stream HD video to their portable devices
in close vicinity. In an unplanned WiFi deployment, such users
may share the same WiFi channels. The RA in this case may
choose to specify different protocol parameters for different
users based on their willingness to tolerate latency or other
performance parameters.
Specifically, in the case of WiFi, transmissions are based on
collision avoidance. The protocol requires devices to sense the
radio channel, and after a transmission in a “free” communica-
tion medium or after detecting the medium to be busy, devices
enter a backoff, where they wait for a random duration within
a contention window. This contention window is initially set
to a small value for all devices and then doubled if packets
losses are observed. One strategy that could be deployed is
to specify different contention windows for different devices
based on a negotiation with the RA. While this is similar to
some of the QoS approaches in WiFi [17], the devices that
employ QoS do so on their own, without any coordination
with an RA. Thus, the resulting behavior may fail to be as
desired. One could imagine an RA being installed in each
apartment complex or a specific urban geographic area (e.g.,
a hotel and its surroundings). With IEEE 802.11ac, it may
be possible for an RA to facilitate negotiation of the channel
bandwidth as well - where channel bandwidths of 20, 40 or
80 MHz may be negotiated to reduce interference or increase
throughput as necessary.
IV. SIMULATION OF CASE I
A. First Simulation Environment
We developed an Agent-based model in NetLogo 5.2.18
to test the first case study. This simulation tool permits to
utilize three types of agents: patches, turtles and links 9.
In our model, we utilize these agents in order to define
ranches, base-stations or radio appliances (RAs), cattle and
the communication process between the RA and cattle.
NetLogo patches are utilized for creating ranches. In this
way, we have defined each ranch as a square formed by 256
patches. This means that each side of the ranch will have
16 patches. We further assume that each patch represents a
small square of 100 meters per side, hence the approximate
area of each ranch is 1 square mile. It is important to note
that each ranch has specific x-axis and y-axis coordinates,
which are useful for defining the ranch boundaries and further
determining the required coverage.
We utilized NetLogo turtles for creating base stations or
radio appliances (RAs) and cattle. The RA is located at the
center of each ranch. In turn, the cows belonging to each
ranch are randomly placed within the ranch area. This means
that a cow’s specific x-axis coordinate is a random number,
uniformly distributed between the maximum and minimum x-
coordinates of the ranch (e.g., x = 1 and x = 16). The same
applies for its y-axis coordinates.
Links are currently utilized to illustrate the flow of infor-
mation between the cattle and the corresponding RAs.
Our model supports the creation of up to four ranches,
where the communications system of this case study has been
deployed. In this way, we envision an enviroment where an
RA periodically monitors the cattle by pinging them in order
to determine their location. Additionally, the sensors attached
to the cattle can transmit information about the nutrition and
hydration levels of each cow. In case these levels fall below a
critical threshold, the sensor is expected to send an emergency
message that will alert the farmer of the situation.
Given that the cows represent the mobile agents of the
system, they have been modeled as moving agents. In an
8Information on this programming tool can be found in the NetLogo User
Manual [23]
9“Turtles are agents that move around in the world. The world is two
dimensional and is divided up into a grid of patches. Each patch is a square
piece of “ground” over which turtles can move. Links are agents that connect
two turtles.” [23]
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attempt to portray the level of activity of real cows, we have set
our cow agents to move only 30% of the time. In this way, at
every simulation time unit (i.e., tick) each cow agent generates
a random number, uniformly distributed between 0 and 100.
When this number is lower than 30 the cow moves. The actual
movement of a cow is given by an angle with respect to the
initial direction that the cow faces and a number of “steps”
in that direction. As such, we have modeled the movement of
a cow as a shift to the right with an angle ✓1 and a rotation
to the left with an angle ✓2. The values of ✓1 and ✓2 are
defined as uniformly distributed random numbers between 0
and 35. After the angle that the agent faces is determined, the
cow moves one step forward in that direction. When a cow
reaches the borders of its ranch it turns to face the center of
the ranch and continues with the aforementioned movement
sequence. We have utilized this movement pattern as a means
to avoid the agents moving in one single direction and going
beyond the boundaries of their own ranches.
1) Model Parameters: For this communication system to
operate, we need to define the appropriate transmission, re-
ception, coverage and propagation parameters. Fig. 1 shows
an example of the location of one ranch in terms of its
x-,y-coordinates and the maximum radius that needs to be
covered. Taking into account this maximum coverage distance,
we can utilize an applicable propagation model and the link
budget formula in order to determine what is the minimum
transmission power that an RA requires for this type of
coverage.
The propagation model that we have chosen is the Extended
Hata model for sub-urban environments, as it has been used
by the NTIA for calculating exclusion zones in the 3.5 GHz
band [7]. The actual parameters utilized in these calculations
are summarized in Table V.
Parameter Value
Frequency 3500 MHz
Transmitting antenna height [Hb] 10 m - 20 m
Mobile antenna height [Hr] 2 m
Distance 1.2 Km
TABLE V: Parameters utilized for calculation of path loss with
Extended Hata Model for suburban environments
After obtaining the applicable path loss values, we consider
the link budget formula (1), where Pr is the minimum power
required by the receiver, Gt and Gr are the transmitter and
receiver antenna gains, Lt and Lr are the transmitter and
receiver losses, respectively and Lp is the path loss calculated
with the Extended Hata model. The specific values for the
these parameters are presented in Table VI.
Pt = Pr  Gt + Lt  Gr + Lr + Lp (1)
2) Finding coordination events: The coexistence of multi-
ple ranches in close proximity may result in mobile devices
(i.e., cow sensors) suffering harmful interference. According
to the governance model we study, interference would call
for coordination among the interfering entities. Applying this
(1, 1) (16, 1)
(1, 16) (16, 16)
8 patches = 800 m
(8,8)
Fig. 1: Graphic representation of one ranch in the simulation
environment
Parameter Value
Minimum Received Power - Pr -80 dBm
Transmitter antenna Gain - Gt 3.3 dB
Receiver antenna Gain - Gr 3.3 dB
Loss at the transmitter - Lt 2 dB
Loss at the receiver - Lr 2 dB
TABLE VI: Parameters for calculating the minimum required
transmission power
to our model, when we consider more than one ranch, the
coverage area of each RA may interfere with the coverage area
of the remaining RAs. In Fig. 2 we illustrate this interference
situation for an area with four adjacent ranches. The circles
surrounding each ranch represent the coverage area of the RA
at the center of each ranch. As it can be observed, the coverage
areas overlap thus creating interference-prone zones, which
may call for coordination events among RAs.
Fig. 2: Interference zones
For interference assessment, we consider there to be harmful
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interference when there are cows (i.e., mobile devices) in the
interference area and when the power level in the interference
zone is above the noise threshold of these devices. Conse-
quently, when these two conditions are met, we consider that a
coordination process needs to take place among the interfering
parties.
The aforementioned conditions are a consequence of the
transmit power chosen by each RA and the noise tolerance of
the mobile devices attached to the cattle. To illustrate these
factors in our model, each RA responds to a specific profile
that determines the transmission power level to utilize. The
profiles have been defined as follows:
• Profile 0 : The transmission power of RAx is the min-
imum power it requires to cover the entire area of the
ranch where it operates.
• Profile 1: The transmission power of RAx is the maxi-
mum allowed by the FCC, i.e., 47 dB.
• Profile 2: The transmission power of RAx is 10 dB above
the maximum power allowed by the FCC.
In the case of the mobile devices, three interference toler-
ance levels are also defined:
• Level 0: -100 dB
• Level 1: -90 dB
• Level 2: -80 dB
Note that all the mobile devices belonging to a particular ranch
will be assigned the same level.
3) Simulation Results: In this section we present the evalu-
ation of three simulation scenarios, which aim at assessing the
interference events that would take place and thus require co-
ordination among RAs. The three simulation scenarios attend
to the following characteristics:
a) Every RA transmits at the power level allowed by the
FCC (i.e., 47dB) and the mobile devices in each ranch
have the highest tolerance to noise.
b) Every RA transmits at the minimum power it requires
to cover the entire ranch where it operates (i.e., 52dB)
and the mobile devices in each ranch have the lowest
interference tolerance.
c) Each RA and group of mobile devices in every ranch
choose independently10 their transmit power profile and
interference tolerance level, respectively.
In each of the our scenarios we also explore how the number
of mobile devices (i.e., groups of cattle) affect the numer
of interference events. In this manner, we simulate scenarios
where the group of cattle varies from three to eight. The results
presented in what follows correspond to those obtained while
exploring the model behavior in 2000 simulation time units or
“ticks” and calculating the average over 10 repetitions.
a) Scenario 1: Our simulation results show zero inter-
ference events, which means that when the RAs limit their
transmission power to the maximum established by the FCC,
10To simulate the independence of each RA and group of mobile devices,
their profiles and interference tolerance levels have been assigned as a
uniformly distributed random number from 0 to 2. Subsequently, the transmit
power and tolerance values have been assigned as defined in subsection IV-A2.
Fig. 3: Aggregate interference incidents for RA1 with 8 groups
of cattle (mobile devices) in a worst-case scenario
there is no need for negotiation among them. However, it
should be noted that this power level does not allow the RAs
to fully cover the area of the ranch. Indeed, for the minimum
received power we consider in our model, this power level
provides a coverage radius of approximately 900 meters. It
follows that, when compared to the required coverage radius of
1130 meters, approximately 20% of the area is left uncovered.
In this scenario we are presented with a trade-off between
avoiding inter-ranch interference (thus negotiations among
RAs) and reaching the required coverage.
b) Scenario 2: In the second scenario we find a signifi-
cant number of interference incidences throughout our simula-
tion. Given that all RAs operate under similar configurations,
in Fig. 3 we present the results obtained with RA1, which
show how the number of interference events when there are 8
groups of cattle in the ranch.
As it can be observed, on average, there are 1 to 2
interference events per time instance, which would require
coordination among RAs.
c) Scenario 3: This scenario aims at capturing varying
behavior of the RAs and sensitivity levels of the mobile
devices. This could be a representation of what might happen
in a real-world scenario as the owners of the equipment may
be able to change the operational parameters of their devices or
choose those that best adapt to the environment. Fig. 4 shows
the results obtained for RA1 in this scenario, when there are
eigth groups of mobile devices operating in the ranch.
B. Second Simulation Environment
We modified the first simulation environment in order to
consider a geographical area where RAs are in closer prox-
imity. For this purpose, we now model a 9-cell grid where
each RA operates and serves groups of users. The actual
configuration of this scenario is shown in Fig. 5. Note that
the goal of this scenario is to determine how the number
of interference events changes as we consider more crowded
spaces.
The model parameters and the method for identifying in-
terference events are the same as those utilized for the first
simulation environment and presented in subsections IV-A1
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Fig. 4: Interference events when the RA’s transmit power and
mobile device sensitivity are particular to each ranch.
Fig. 5: Configuration of second simulation environment
and IV-A2 , respectively. We ran our simulation considering
the situation in which each RA chooses independently its
transmission power according to the three profiles explained
in subsection IV-A2. Each profile is assigned to every RA as
a uniformly distributed random number between 0 and 2.
1) Simulation Results: In this section we include the results
for the most critical case. This corresponds to the inteference
events generated and perceived by the RA and users belonging
to the cell (or ranch) located at the center of the grid. To
generate our simulation results, we varied the number of user
groups from 3 to 8.
Fig. 6 shows the interference incidences for RA5 during the
first 200 simulation time ticks. RA5 is located in the central
cell. 11
Our simulation results show that as the number of user
groups increases, so do the number of interference events.
Note that the total number of interference events is lower than
that of the first case. This is due to the lower transmission
power required for coverage of the entire cell area as the
latter is significantly smaller than the case of four, bigger,
ranches. From these results we can infer that a negotiation
mechanism that involves reduction of transmission power may
11The aggregate interference events correspond to the average number of
events across 10 simulation runs, each lasting 2000 time ticks.
Fig. 6: Interference events for the central cell in a 9-cell grid
Fig. 7: Aggregate Interference Events for RA1 when negotia-
tion is implemented
effectively reduce the number of interference events in the
studied environment12.
C. Implementing Negotiations
After analyzing the interference events and their patterns in
the previous subsections, we study how the incorporation of a
negotiation mechanisms impacts the number of interference
events and thus performance of each RA. The negotiation
process operates as follows: Let RAx be the RA causing
interference and RAy the “interference victim”.
1) If the transmit power of RAx is higher than the min-
imum required to cover its ranch area, RAx should
reduce its transmit power (preferably to the minimum)
2) If the transmit power RAx is already at the minimum
(or below), RAx switches to a different frequency band
(within the 3500 to 3700 MHz range).
We tested this negotiation mechanism in the 4-ranch sce-
nario, considering each RA to choose its power and device
interference tolerance independently from one another. The
results obtained are presented in Fig. 7
Fig. 8 compares the average interference events that occur
in the first 200 time ticks, instead of the aggregate values. We
have chosen this period as a sample of what occurs throughout
12This situation would hold as long as a lower transmit power still permits
to fulfill the coverage requirements.
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the entire simulation, as there is not a significant change in the
results obtained as time progresses. In this figure, the reduction
of the interference events is evident when implementing a
simple negotiation mechanism. It is also important to note that
the power adjustment is done in terms of the power required
for ranch coverage instead of what is allowed by regulation. In
this manner, some RAs may be transmitting at a power higher
than the limited established by the FCC and still is able to
avoid causing interference to the neighboring RAs.
V. DISCUSSION
The objective of this analysis is to introduce the concept
of polycentric governance in a spectrum sharing setting. Our
goal is to explore how this approach may offer a flexible
solution for governance and thus show that one-size-fits all
protection limits are unnecessary. In section II we presented
the requirements of a polycentric governance system. In what
follows, we show how some of these requirements have been
addressed in our model.
• Boundaries: This corresponds to the geographical, tech-
nical and regulatory limits associated with our model.
They are expressed through the layout and size of the
ranches, the disposition of the mobile devices, the maxi-
mum allowed transmission power as well as the required
transmission power, propagation models that permit to
identify coverage and the sensitivity of the receivers.
• Appropriateness to local conditions: We explore this
condition by analyzing two different settings, where the
main difference lies on the proximity of adjacent ranches
and in consequence of the possible interference events.
Additonally, in our simulations we allow users to go
beyond the allowed and required transmission powers,
when this action does not result in harmful interference
events. When negotiations are implemented, users are
able to establish solutions that are appropriate to the
band that is being utilized and to their own coverage
requirements.
• Collective Choice Arrangements: The negotiation
mechanism is implemented based on the interactions
of the interfering parties. In this way, the solution to
interference problems is given by user coordination and
their ability to manage their common resources.
• Monitoring: This feature is expressed by tracking the
number of interference events and thus the need for
negotiation. Monitoring attends to rules, incorporated in
the model, that permit an SC to determine when to
signal these interference events. Even after negotiation is
implemented, we still need monitoring in order to assess
whether the negotiation process has been effective.
• Conflict Resolution Mechanism: This is observed
through the negotiation mechanism that we have put in
place. In our models, conflict resolution is prompted by
the party first detecting interference and the negotiation
process is carried out in terms of transmission power
and/or band utilized.
These governance goals/characteristics have been incorpo-
rated into the model design and the results that we have
obtained illustrate their operation. By design, we have kept
our model rather simple, given that our objective has been
to explore how likely it is for polycentric governance to
be implemented. This led us to ignore, for the time being,
important technical details regarding wireless communica-
tions, as these would represent a distraction from our main
goal. Nevertheless, we were still able to represent a plausible
wireless setting which is a potential IoT application.
The creation and study of this model has enabled us to
compare a regulatory model based on establishing maximum
required transmission power levels, to a regulatory setting
where these levels are adjusted according to the local envi-
ronment and where the solution of interference problems is
addressed via collective action. It is important to point out
that, as in any governance system, there are trade-offs to
analyze. For instance, a national regulatory model may succeed
at avoiding interference, but it may fail at providing users with
the coverage they require in areas where higher power levels
are possible.
VI. CONCLUSION
The database driven Spectrum Access System (SAS) was
designed to implement ex ante control over a defined elec-
trospace to enforce a particular set of usage rights in the
form of protection from interference events. As such, a SAS
is a governance mechanism for spectrum. Though SAS was
designed as a centralized control mechanism, in this paper
we propose and demonstrate through some toy models the
feasibility of using SAS to implement a decentralized, locally
driven spectrum policy. This approach to spectrum use could
dynamically adapt to the needs of every particular area and
thus manage resource access, interference and assignment.
Decentralized, polycentric forms of spectrum management
have properties that can be mapped to the resource systems
studied by Elinor Ostrom and her collaborators.
To explore this approach, we examine two case studies: the
first explores the need for governance in a communications
system developed utilizing the CBRS band, while the second
one focuses on alternatives provided by tweaks to the IEEE
802.11 protocol.
For our analysis of the CBRS band, we have developed an
Agent-based model that portrays the utilization of a system
for monitoring cattle in a rural area, where four ranches are
located in relatively close proximity. Through the evaluation
of our simulation results, we can first point out that while
the power limits established by the FCC avoid the need for
negotiation among entities, the associated cost includes a
reduction in the coverage area, which is an important factor
in the system we explore. Additionally, we find that as radio
appliances increase their transmit power, interference events
arise; however, the increment of this events is not constant
or linear, which permits us to infer that there are occassions
in which interference is not present. This would leave us with
opportunities to negotiate access in terms of time in addition to
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Fig. 8: Comparing average interference events in scenarios with and without negotiation
frequency. Finally, when we characterize the different agents
participating in each ranch independently from one another,
we find a lower number of interference events. This suggests
that heterogeneity of operation also creates opportunities for
negotiation and coordination among devices.
The second case study analyzes the application of poly-
centric governance to an environment where IEEE 802.11 is
the predominant technology. The difference in performance
requirements, quality of service and resource usage may make
it suitable to deploy a system of local governance rather than
a global coordination system.
In both cases, open questions remain regarding various
technical and regulatory issues. Nevertheless, through our case
studies we poin tout that incorporating a mechanism that
allows entities to learn from local conditions and adjust to
particular environments may permit to create enforcement
methods that are more suitable than those which have been
broadly defined.
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